A 64th minute of madness sent Dallas’ chances for a result against a hostile Houston crowd and squad Saturday evening crashing and burning to the BBVA Compass Stadium floor. But what of the previous two-thirds of a match that FCD had played against their intrastate rivals? How did Dallas outshoot, out-create, and dominate the course of two-thirds of the match Saturday?
For starters, Hyndman posed FC Dallas in a 4-2-3-1 formation, which has been used infrequently for much of the season. The 4-2-3-1 is balanced in every way. It allows for defensive coverage and pressing up high on the wings with two holding midfielders to cover the back line, who are intended to shield the center halves and filter attacks towards the wings.
Offensively, it pushes up two wings to move the formation from a 4-2-3-1 defensively to a 4-3-3 offensively. Reasonably, one of the defensive center midfielders can creep up and wander higher than the other when in possession. But the real key to attacking with the 4-2-3-1 is to have pacey wingers who can, when isolated against outside backs, take them on and provide quality service from the flanks. Queue Jackson and Castillo.
Dallas was on its front foot for the entire match, outshooting and out-creating Houston in the offensive third, prior to Benitez’s sending off. This came to be for a few tactical adjustments. For one, center midfielders Hernandez, Jacobson, and Leyva were less wasteful with the ball. They played a short game, and were less direct. In fact, most direct balls sent were quickly intercepted or incomplete, but in relatively low quantity. The three center midfielders took a page from Claude Makelele’s book and simply won balls and quickly distributed wide or back. Balls normally dumped up to Blas Perez were instead funneled to the fleet-footed Castillo and crafty Jackson on the perimeter.
Surprisingly enough, Leyva held his own well in the center of midfield as the trequartista, despite his diminutive stature, and was by far the best player out of the three in the middle when it came to combination play. FCD’s best early chance was created via quick passing between Leyva, Castillo, and Sealy, which unfortunately ended with a blocked shot at the top of the 18 yard box, despite the great build up (and brilliant movement inside by Castillo).
As for Sealy, he was hidden most of the match, did hold the ball up well at times, but on the whole provided little penetration in the attack. He is not the best fit for a target forward, but forced the team to alter its patterns of play. A less direct approach allowed the team to settle into possession-oriented patterns of play and ultimately not put any offensive onus where it didn’t need to be: in the middle of the field.
With more emphasis put on flank play, FCD bought into it wholeheartedly. Certainly the two best offensive performers of the match were Castillo and Jackson, as they were a part of every good goal scoring chance for Dallas. Quick combination play in front, and then around the Dynamo back line allowed Castillo to slip in on goal twice during the first half. Sadly the quality ended once he was within reaching distance of the net. Benitez and Loyd also found themselves engaged in the attack more often, as the pressure provided higher up the pitch by Castillo and Jackson allowed the two to maraud up the lines.
To Dallas’s advantage the emphasis on the flanks offhandedly opened up the middle of the pitch. Any time Houston scrambled to organize its defense the Dynamo’s attention was first directed towards Castillo and Jackson. FCD took advantage of this one-mindedness in the 58th minute, as Jackson brilliantly swapped with Bryan Leyva to receive the ball just in front of both Houston center-halves, beat Bobby Boswell, feed Sealy, only to hammer home the rebound from Sealy’s saved shot. The Brazilian’s hard work had finally paid off, and FCD had gained a deserved goal after pouring numbers forward and attacking with real intent and aggression since the beginning of the second half.
Defensively Dallas held its own, save the early defensive letdown that allowed Will Bruin to shin a clearance from Pertuz into the back of the net. The 4-2-3-1, when done right, crowds the midfield and effectively puts four central halves in the middle of the field (LDCM, RDCM, CB, CB). Opposed to the 4-4-2 you end up with more coverage throughout the midfield and numerical superiority in the center of midfield. Houston didn’t attempt much possession through the center of midfield partially due to this, and the fact that they are not a very possession-oriented side.
DH, AJ, BL forced much of Houston’s play to the flanks, where Houston was met with stiff defense via Castillo and Jackson. The eventual Brazilian goal scorer was active on both sides of the ball, and won balls up and down the right flank. The three center midfielders didn’t win a ton of balls through the center of the park, but Adam Moffatt and Je_Vaughn Watson weren’t crafty enough to split the three and find the frames of Ching or Bruin. This put more of the onus on Benitez and Loyd out wide.
But defending the counter the center midfield trio fell very far short, and did not do sufficient enough work back to cover. Bruin’s early shin ball was a culmination of poor positioning, tracking, and a let down by the Dallas midfield defensively. The point to having two center defensive midfielders is to prevent any direct attack on the center of the back line; Hernandez and Jacobson failed to do this, especially when the Dynamo were on the counter and the two could not settle quickly enough in position. To their own credit, they didn’t, whether intended or not, allow the Dynamo many chances through the middle of the field for the remainder of the game.
The ever-present Matt Hedges highlighted the Dallas defense. Rookie year or not, the kid has settled into his role with a good command of his abilities and great instincts off the ball, all of which were on display Saturday evening. By far the most active defender for Dallas, he and Hernan Pertuz forged a good partnership, despite little game experience together. Hedges has been a surprise in 2012, but mostly for the quick way he has adapted to starting and the pace of the league.
Overall
Dallas, once again, shot itself in the foot. No matter how decently the match had panned out for FCD, and quite a bit of it was in their hands, Benitez’s sending off with 25 minutes remaining altered the game in an irreparable way. Optimists would recall that FCD held off Colorado for half an hour with nine men on the field; the same attitude prevailed until Moffatt’s game-winner. The defensive organization, the confidence from constant attack, and simplified tactics all soon ended with the sending off. It was roughly 65 minutes of quality soccer from Dallas, despite the injuries, despite the hostile crowd, and despite the team’s lackluster results of late.
Hyndman went on the record this morning, noting “…maybe what we do now is take them away from the team. Maybe you’re not going to play until we can now trust you to control your emotion.”
The team’s lack of luck and 10-game losing streak, along with building frustration due to both, can be self-perpetuating. It is understandable to be on the edge after seemingly endless spats of poor form; offering hard fouls and getting the occasional booking should be almost expected. On the contrary, an occasional booking for Benitez is a game-by-game issue. His play prior to the 64th minute of madness had been quite good, actually. But the team needs composure from a man who is continually called upon to be a lynchpin of an already ailing side. This saga has played itself out all too often in 2012 for Dallas, regrettably. Benitez certainly hasn’t been alone this season. His feet have been in the air and his head has been in the ground just like those of Zach Loyd, Blas Perez, Daniel Hernandez, and Brek Shea. Ultimately, FCD’s head hasn’t collapsed quite yet, but it leaves supporters and the players alike asking in unison, “Where is our mind?”
(image courtesy of fcdallas.com)
